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Introduction
The International Monetary Fund has come under increased scrutiny and attack, with some of the most intense criticisms aiming on the link between its programs and reduced economic growth in borrower countries (e.g. Vreeland 2000, Hutchison 2003) . The channels by which the IMF could influence growth, however, have rarely been made explicit. In no study those channels are disentangled empirically. But how could IMF programs, which are designed to stimulate economic growth, actually achieve the opposite?
In theory, the IMF can influence economic outcomes by its money, the policy conditions it attaches to its loans and, more generally, its policy advice. The overall effect of the IMF on economic growth depends on the net effect of those channels. Nevertheless, the literature so far made no attempt to disentangle them. No study did take compliance with conditionality adequately into account.
1 As Joyce (2004: 12) put it:
"This is a surprising omission, since presumably a country's economic performance will vary in response to its implementation of the program's policies. Assessing the performance of program countries without discriminating among them by their degree of compliance could give a misleading view of the effects of IMF programs. On the other hand, if no systematic linkages exist, then new questions arise about the effectiveness of Fund-supported policies and the need for conditionality."
This paper contributes to the literature in trying to disentangle the effects of programs, disbursed loans, and compliance with conditionality on economic growth. It analyzes, whether implementation of IMF conditionality influences growth rates. The paper thus 1 There are, of course, several papers including the share of money disbursed under an IMF program as explanatory variables (Conway 1994 , Hutchison and Noy 2003 , Hajro and Joyce 2004 . None of them tries to disentangle the effect of advice and money from those of compliance with conditionality and none of them uses a more direct measure of compliance. Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2004) and Nsouli, Mourmouras and Atoian (2003) employ data from the Fund's MONA database (see section 2). The former examined countries in transition to market economies between 1994 and 1997, the latter focus on a greater sample over the period combines two strands of the literature on IMF programs: those on growth and those on compliance.
What I find is, basically, that IMF programs reduce growth rates when accounting for self-selection into those programs. Depending on the proxy used for compliance, there is weak evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative effect; IMF loans do not affect economic growth.
The next section summarizes what we know about the implementation of IMF conditions, the literature on the impact of the Fund on economic growth is shortly summarized thereafter. Section 4 discusses the various channels by which the IMF could influence economic growth; section 5 describes method and data employed. Section 6 presents the empirical analysis. The final section concludes.
Implementation of IMF Conditionality
Measuring the implementation of IMF conditions is not straightforward. Many earlier studies employed proprietary data, mostly from the Fund's internal documents. Using such documents, first evidence on compliance with conditionality was presented by Beveridge and Kelly (1980) . They showed that out of 105 countries with upper-credit-tranche programs implemented between 1969-78 only 60 percent achieved the target for the overall fiscal deficit and 54 percent complied with the credit ceiling. Another study on implementation of IMF conditions is Haggard (1985) , who reports extremely low rates of compliance with conditions under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) between 1974-84. Of the thirty cases studied, sixteen were cancelled and eight more were not implemented in their original form. Zulu and Nsouli (1985) found similar results in a study of African adjustment programs between 1980-81.
Only half of the countries achieved the negotiated credit ceilings. Moreover, compliance with [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . However, the short sample employed in those studies did not allow a rigorous test of the IMF's impact on long-run growth.
fiscal targets has been poor. According to Edwards (1989) Unfortunately, the MONA data are not without problems (Bird and Willett 2004) .
Only those programs are included in the database, which have been reviewed by the Executive Board. Programs that are interrupted or permanently cancelled will therefore not be covered -which is likely to overstate compliance. As another problem with this database, coverage does not go back in time far enough to allow longer-term economic analysis.
The most widely used measure of program implementation has been a proxy suggested by Killick (1995) . He employed IMF loans agreed but left undrawn at program expiration as an indicator of performance under a program. Column 3 of Table 1 contains the share of programs in effect in a certain year where more than 25 percent of the agreed money remain undrawn at program expiration. Killick (1995) gives evidence that highly indebted countries as well as countries with small amounts of IMF credit are less likely to complete a program and that fiscal conditions are especially unlikely to be met. He also stresses that new programs are approved for political reasons even if non-compliance with conditionality of previous ones is evident.
Results similar to those of Killick are reported by Mussa and Savastano (1999) . Employing the same proxy, Joyce (2003) showed that a country's trade openness, its government's ideological cohesion, the duration of its political regime and its degree of political openness are significant determinants of program implementation. Bird and Willett (2004) summarize the disadvantages of this approach. Resources may not be withdrawn, because of improvements in the economy. Sometimes programs are approved on a precautionary basis only, without intension to draw at all. On the other hand, the Fund might disburse its money even though implementation of conditions has been low, for example because it feels that significant progress has been made, or even for political reasons. There is an additional shortcoming (Dreher 2003 Dreher (2003) compliance depends negatively on government consumption, short-term debt and positively on GDP per capita. Compliance has also been found to be lower before national elections.
IMF and Economic Growth
Starting in the 1970s, the IMF "placed increasing emphasis on economic growth as a policy objective. Growth became increasingly prominent as an objective in the 1980s". The third method is regression analysis -it has been used by most recent studies.
When endogeneity of the IMF-related variables is carefully taken into account, this method seems to be the most promising one. However, solving the endogeneity problem is not straightforward. Most of the older studies did not even try to solve this problem, 5 while more recent ones like Vreeland and Przeworski (2000) and Barro and Lee (2001) take endogeneity into account. None of the existing studies, however, adequately separates the effects of the IMF's advice and compliance with conditionality from money disbursed.
6
As can be seen in Table 2 , existing studies do not provide a clear answer as to whether IMF programs affect growth and, if so, whether they increase or reduce growth rates. In part, this conflicting evidence arises from differences in country coverage, sample periods and methodology employed. However, even with similar samples and methodology, contradictory results emerge.
Channels for the impact of the IMF on economic growth
There is a multitude of channels by which the IMF can influence economic outcomes.
First, program approval is obviously associated with a certain amount of money. 7 The effect of this money is, however, not evident. While, in theory, IMF credit is meant to alleviate restructuring the economy, in practice the result might be the exact opposite: Money disbursed increases borrowing governments' leeway, thus reducing incentives to reform (Boockmann and Dreher 2003) . As a consequence, governments pursue inappropriate policies longer than they would otherwise (Bandow 1994). 8 Second, availability of IMF money may deteriorate economic policy even before it has been disbursed. According to the "moral-hazard hypothesis", IMF lending may be interpreted 5 Conway (1994) is a noteworthy exception.
6 Hutchison and Noy (2003) include their measures of implementation only separately but not in addition to the IMF program variable and exclude money disbursed altogether. Their measure of implementation could thus reflect the average effect of compliance with conditionality and negative incentives due to increased budgetary leeway.
7 In addition to the Fund's own resources, IMF programs might exert a catalytic effect on other financial flows.
Empirical support for this hypothesis is, however, rather weak. For an excellent summary of this literature see Bird and Rowlands (2002) .
as a (subsidized) income insurance against adverse shocks (Vaubel 1983) . 9 The insurance cover induces the potential recipients to excessively lower their precautions against such damages (or even to intentionally generate a crisis). There is a considerable body of evidence that the balance of payments problems of IMF borrowers have been largely of their own making 10 and that macroeconomic performance during inter-program years has been deteriorating as the number of past programs increased. 11 As has been shown by Dreher and Vaubel (2004a) , economic policy is indeed more expansive in countries with higher IMF loans available (as measured by the country's undrawn resources with the Fund). If it is true that the IMF induces moral hazard and thus "bad" economic policy, reduced growth would be the consequence. A fourth channel by which the IMF can influence growth is its policy advice (Boockmann and Dreher 2003) . Advice of the IMF is often discussed publicly and may influence politics in the longer run (Killick 1994: 156) . According to Fischer (2001: 237) , one of the IMF's main contributions to reforms is that it stands consistently for a particular approach to economic policy. Therefore, the long-run impact of the IMF reaches beyond the immediate effects of conditions and finance. IMF advice to policymakers might thus stimulate (or reduce) growth independent of policy conditionality.
Method and Data
The regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis. Following Barro and Lee 14 Country selection is driven by data availability. The countries included in this study are listed in Appendix C. 15 A previous version of the paper also included an index for the rule of law. It has been, however, insignificant in all specifications and omitting it substantially increased the number of observations. The main results are unchanged.
As has been argued in section 4, the IMF might influence growth via its advice, conditionality, money, and moral hazard it induces with the borrowing governments. Only one of those channels can be directly measured: IMF loans disbursed (in percent of GDP). To proxy the degree of implementation of conditionality, 16 five-year averages of three different variables introduced in section 2 are employed. First, I use the share of the agreed money actually disbursed, which has been introduced by Killick (1995) as measure of compliance with conditionality. Second, I employ the dummy proposed by Dreher (2003) . It is one, if at most 25 percent of the amount which would be available for a certain year under equal phasing remained undrawn and zero otherwise. The third measure is the dummy for suspension of IMF programs established by Edwards (2001a) . 17 The underlying data are shown in columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table 1 . As can be seen from the Table, however, the different proxies do not provide a consistent picture. It has been outlined in section 2 that, clearly, all of them have their drawbacks, and it is therefore not obvious, which one is the most adequate measure of compliance. The results of the empirical analysis thus have to be interpreted cautiously.
In principle, the amount of IMF credit a country receives may also proxy the direct effect of advice on policies. However, advice and credit volumes are probably not proportional. The number of arrangements in effect might thus be a better measure for advice than the flows of finances (Boockmann and Dreher 2003) . Controlling for the amount of credit and compliance with conditionality, the dummy for existing IMF programs would in part capture the effect of advice.
Whether the IMF induces moral hazard with its borrowers can not be tested directly with those data. 18 To some extent, however, the existence of an IMF program could create incentives to run "bad" economic policy in order to stay eligible for IMF money.
The analysis should cover only those arrangements that were in effect over much of the year in question. Only those years are thus coded as program years where an arrangement has been active over at least five months in a given calendar year.
Since the data are five-year averages, the participation index varies continuously might be a selection problem. 21 The same is true for the amount of money agreed, which probably rises with the severity of crisis. Endogeneity due to self selection might even be a problem with the compliance variables. As an additional source of bias, the decision to participate in the IMF program might have an influence on other determinants of growth, like, e.g., policy instruments, also.
There are various methods to deal with the selection problem, and the literature on the IMF is rich on applications. Most studies pursue either some variant of Heckman's (1979) estimator or an instrumental variables approach; recently the method of matching has also been applied. 22 All three of those approaches have their benefits, but also imply drawbacks.
Estimating the participation equation and then including the inverse Mills ratio, as suggested
by Heckman (1979) , depends implicitly on auxiliary restrictions like assumptions about the distribution of error terms (Barro and Lee 2001) and the 'correct' specification of the participation equation. The challenge with the instrumental variables approach, clearly, is in finding variables that affect the probability of program participation but do not affect economic growth other than through their impact on participation. The problem of finding the correct variables is even more severe with respect to the matching approach, where matching of "treatment" and "control" groups would only result in unbiased estimates, when the decision to enter IMF programs could be accounted for by the matching procedure (see Przeworski and Limongi 1996) . On theoretical grounds, thus, the choice of method is not obvious. For three reasons I chose the instrumental variables approach. First, there are good instruments available for participation in IMF programs. Second, the focus of this study is not only on IMF programs, but on loans and compliance also. Estimating the relevant equations simultaneously is thus preferable. And third, the Heckman approach is best when the selection 22 With respect to the IMF and economic growth, the Heckman methodology has been employed, among others, by Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Hutchison (2003) . However, this method usually performs poorly, with an inverse Mills ratio not significantly different from zero Noy 2003, Hutchison 2004 ). Hardoy variable is dichotomous, while the instrumental variables approach is preferable when the selection variables are continuous, which is the case for two of the three variables considered here.
As outlined above, the problem with this approach is finding reliable instruments. As possible determinants of programs, loans, and compliance, the initial regressions included a huge number of variables that have been suggested in the literature: the rate of monetary expansion, the overall budget deficit, general government consumption relative to GDP, real GDP growth, GDP per capita, the share of foreign short-term debt in total foreign debt, the total level of outstanding debt, total debt service (in percent of GDP), the rate of inflation, a country's international reserves (in months of imports), the current account balance as a From the initial regressions I followed a general to specific approach, consecutively eliminating the variables with the lowest t-value. 25 Eventually, only determinants significant at least at the ten percent level are retained in the regressions. Note that, potentially, many of the variables employed in the program, loans, and compliance regressions might be correlated 23 The index is constructed using principal components analysis. It employs the following categories:
assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crisis, riots and revolutions. Since those variables are highly collinear, they should not be included all separately in one regression.
with growth, so they would not be valid as instruments. I come back to this in the results section.
The next step is to replicate the OLS analysis using instruments for IMF programs, money disbursed, and compliance with conditionality. I follow Barro and Lee (2001) Tables 3 and 4 report results for the IMF variables. As can be seen, only three variables have been found to be significant predictors of Fund programs. Programs are more likely the lower a country's short-term debt, the higher its debt service paid and the less democratic the country. The result for democracy is in line with other researchers claiming that the Fund uses its credit to support undemocratic regimes (Edwards and Santaella 1993 , Bandow 1994 and Vreeland 2003 . This result remains when GDP per capita and other variables controlling for development are included in the regression (not reported in the with rising interest rates the interest rate subsidy provided by the Fund increases and its loans become more attractive. 28 Better rule of law and lower dependence of a country's government on special interests probably increases the IMF's supply, whereas political instability is a proxy for the severity of a crisis.
Empirical Estimates
Note that the explanatory variables are jointly significant at the one percent level in both regressions of Table 3 . 29 However, the explained share of the dependent variable's variation is rather low.
With respect to the compliance indices ( 27 For a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of IMF programs and loans employing yearly data see Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2004) . 28 Since 1990, however, the rates of charge have been linked to short-term market interest rates in the main industrial countries so that the subsidy is fairly constant for short-term loans. 29 According to Barro and Lee (2001) , a country's share of quotas and professional staff influence the size and frequency of IMF loans. I cannot employ the former in a fixed effects specification, since it varies only slightly over time; the latter is not publicly available. different measures employed. However, the explanatory variables are jointly significant at the one percent level in all three regressions.
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Program continuation is more likely with more foreign direct investment in the program country, greater freedom of the press and better rule of law. The results are easy to explain: Inflows of investment lead to (or signal) economic recovery, which makes compliance with conditionality easier, thus reducing probability of program suspension. An independent and free press is essential to provide access to information about development policy, creating support for reforms, therefore making program suspension less likely. A better rule of law also makes compliance more likely. As proxied by the index measuring equally spaced disbursement, compliance is significantly higher with a lower rate of monetary expansion, higher inflation, lower GDP per capita, higher trade volume, higher school enrollment, greater political instability and more civil liberties. Reducing monetary expansion is usually included as a performance criterion in Fund programs -high expansion thus induces the IMF to withhold its money. High inflation, low political stability and reductions in per capita GDP indicate the severity of the crisis and tend to increase compliance. The positive influence of school enrollment and civil liberties is also easy to explain: A better educated and free society better understands and participates in policy making processes, thus increasing the chance for reforms.
The share of money disbursed relative to money agreed over the five-year-period is significantly higher in more democratic countries and when inflation is low. Democratic governments frequently include conditions in IMF programs which serve their own interests (Vreeland 1999) . This is because they can then blame the IMF for their policies ("scapegoat hypothesis"). Compliance is thus more likely. High inflation, to the contrary, makes compliance more difficult. 30 Note that in the compliance-regressions only those countries and periods were included where an IMF program has been in effect. With respect to the influence of the IMF, results are rather disappointing. IMF programs and new IMF loans (in percent of GDP) are never significant at conventional levels.
The share of agreed IMF loans actually disbursed over the program period reduces growth at the one percent level of significance (column 3a). If interacted with the program participation variable, however, the effect becomes insignificant (column 4a). 31 Compliance as measured with Edward's index also reduces growth at the one percent level of significance if included separately in the regression (column 3b) and has no effect when interacted with program participation (column 4b). If measured by equally phased disbursements, compliance seems to reduce growth further in the full model of column 4c (and has no effect according to the estimates in column 3c).
The negative impact of compliance may be due to the endogeneity of compliance: The more severe the crisis, the more likely it is the government breaches the Fund's conditionality, giving rise to the significantly negative coefficient. As an alternative explanation, of course, IMF conditions might be harmful to growth, so that compliance with those conditions worsens performance. This is particularly likely in the short run where a devaluation of the 31 The compliance measures do not enter specifications 4a-4c individually, since compliance is highly correlated with program participation. Clearly, compliance can only be observed, when programs are in effect.
domestic currency and tight fiscal and monetary policy have for a long time been the preferred measures to deal with balance-of-payments crises.
32 Table 6 presents results when IMF programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality are instrumented. In the first stage of the regressions, the endogenous variables are thus regressed on all exogenous variables included in the system. However, only those variables can be used as instruments that do not have a direct impact on economic growth.
Inflation and school enrollment are included in the growth regressions also, and can thus not serve as instruments. . 33 The coefficient of school enrollment enters the growth regressions always insignificantly. Since the regressors have been chosen according to theroretical considerations, I nevertheless keep the variable in the regressions. 34 Contrary to this, Boockmann and Dreher (2003) found some evidence that IMF loans make growth-oriented policies in the borrower countries less likely.
at the ten percent level of significance. The negative influence of the compliance measure for equally phased disbursements reported in the previous Table disappears when instruments for compliance are employed (column 4c). It thus seems that the main reason for the significantly negative coefficient reported in Table 5 is the endogeneity of compliance with conditionality.
According to the estimates of column 4b, economic growth is on average 7.48
percentage points lower when an IMF program has been in effect over the whole five-yearperiod, which amounts to about 1.5 percentage points per year. This is in line with results of previous studies, estimating the costs of IMF programs in terms of foregone output to be in the range of 0.7-2.5 percentage points during each year of program participation (Hutchison 2004) . If there has been full compliance over this period, the negative effect is reduced by 0.06 percentage points (or slightly more than 0.01 percentage points per year).
In summary, there is considerable evidence that participation in IMF programs reduces economic growth when endogeneity is taken into account. Depending on the proxy employed, there is some evidence that compliance with conditionality reduces this negative effect.
The negative impact of IMF programs holding compliance and loans disbursed constant is not easy to explain. There are some possibilities. As argued above, this variable might measure the IMF's advice (in excess of conditionality). The negative result would thus lead to the conclusion that the IMF's concept of economic reforms is flawed and in the long run, even when conditionality is not implemented, reduces growth. To some extent this negative impact might also reflect the effects of moral hazard. If the intention to sign an IMF program deteriorates economic policy, this would increase the probability of actual program approvals and, at the same time, would decrease economic growth. Similarly, in order to stay eligible for IMF money, necessary changes might be delayed. The existence of an IMF program could thus produce incentives to run "bad" economic policy and would so lower growth.
Alternatively, the instruments employed might not adequately capture the underlying crises, so that the effect of the IMF is outweighed by the effect of the crises. And finally, the proxies for compliance might be too crude to actually capture true implementation of conditionality.
Summary and Conclusion
"Our primary objective is growth" (Michael Camdessus, former IMF Managing Director, Statement before the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Geneva, July 11, 1990, cited in Przeworski and Vreeland 2000) .
As has been shown in several studies, with respect to this objective, IMF programs are a failure. This paper provided further evidence. While supporting previous results on the negative relationship between IMF programs and economic growth, there is some, albeit weak, evidence that compliance with IMF conditionality does increase growth rates once taking account of sample selection. In any case, the effect of compliance is quantitatively small compared to the overall reduction and depends on the proxy employed for compliance.
Since IMF loans and compliance are controlled for in the empirical analysis, the remaining negative impact of IMF programs might probably either be due to "bad" advice given by the IMF or the moral hazard it induces with its borrowers. To further disentangle the components reflected by the program participation variable remains an interesting area for future research.
The results have implications for the design of conditionality. Whether or not the IMF should impose conditions on sovereign countries has been highly debated from the very beginning of the IMF's operations. 35 It has recently been shown that its conditions do not influence economic policy (Dreher and Vaubel 2004b) . The empirical results of this paper have shown that if compliance with conditionality has an impact on growth at all, this impact is quantitatively small. As one interpretation of this result, conditions imposed by outside actors might be circumvented, even if the officially agreed criteria have been met. To some extent, the results of this paper support Dollar and Svensson (2000) , who show that governments which are inclined to reform must be identified and can not be created by international organizations. In order to lend more effectively, it would therefore be most important for the IMF to detect factors influencing ownership and thus the willingness to reform. Arguably, if the IMF would support reform-minded governments, its loans might make a difference (even if its advice might not).
The results also allow a different interpretation. As claimed by the IMF, conditions are the outcome of a bargaining process between government and Fund. 36 They might therefore reflect the government's agenda instead of being imposed by the IMF. As a consequence, compliance with conditionality does not make a difference with respect to economic growththe same policies would have been implemented without the Fund's conditions. In any case conditionality would not be necessary. 35 For a recent discussion of the theoretical arguments see Dreher and Vaubel (2004b) .
36 Conwy (2003) provides empirical evidence in support of this claim. 65  1971  58  37  1972  54  61  1973  70  47  1974  44  35  1975  58  63  1976  64  53  1977  56  46  1978  69  52  1979  18  52  71  1980  33  56  68  1981  40  62  68  1982  31  21  65  1983  36  39  57  1984  39  48  49  1985  39  42  55  1986  43  30  73  1987  37  48  67  1988  49  19  64  1989  48  58  80  1990  56  78  62  1991  45  59  63  1992  39  33  48  58  1993  29  33  29  71  1994  22  55  38  72  1995  21  39  22  72  1996  33  50  39  77  1997  67  29  29  69  1998  40  30  57  1999  57  57  61  2000  40 Compliance is proxied by the share of agreed IMF loans disbursed (3a, 4a), Edwards' variable for program continuation (3b, 4b) and, respectively, the measure for equally phased disbursements (3c, 4c).
t-statistics in parentheses. Levels of significance: 1 percent (*), 5 percent (**), 10 percent ( o ). All regressions include dummies for each time period and country. Compliance is proxied by the share of agreed IMF loans disbursed (3a, 4a), Edwards' variable for program continuation (3b, 4b) and, respectively, the measure for equally phased disbursements (3c, 4c). The IMF variables are instrumented with the variables of Table 3 and 4.
t-statistics in parentheses. Levels of significance: 1 percent (*), 5 percent (**), 10 percent ( o ). All regressions include dummies for each time period and country.
